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Abstract: We run a large field experiment with an online company specializing in selling used
automobiles via ascending auctions. We manipulate experimentally the maximum amount which bidders
can bid above the current standing price, thus affecting the ease with which bidders can engage in jump
bidding. We test between the intimidation vs. costly bidding hypotheses of jump bidding by looking at
the effect of these jump-bidding restrictions on average seller revenue. We find evidence consistent with
costly bidding in one market (Texas), but intimidation in the other market (New York). This difference in
findings between the two markets appears partly attributable to the more prominent presence of sellers
who are car dealers in the Texas market.
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1. Introduction
The development and application of auction theory has been one of the most prominent
achievements in economics over the last few decades (at least since Vickrey, 1961). For book
length treatments of auction theory see Milgrom (2004) and Krishna (2002). Along with
theoretical literature there has been a growing empirical literature on auctions (for surveys see
Ashenfelter and Graddy (2003) and Hendricks and Porter (2007)). In this paper we report the
results of a large scale field experiment in which a major firm in online automobile auctions
allowed us to change some of the parameters of the auctions.
In these experiments we introduce manipulations to test theories of why bidders engage in jump
bidding – that is, why bidders choose to submit a bid which exceeds the minimum bidding
increment. Jump bidding is an endemic feature of real-world ascending (―English‖) auctions;
this includes the famous FCC wireless spectrum auctions2 which the US government has been
running regularly for almost twenty years, online (eBay) auctions, and also conventional art and
antiquities auctions run by Sotheby's and Christies for hundreds of years. At the same time,
jump bidding has also been observed in many experimental implementations of ascending
auctions (McCabe et. al. (1990), Banks et al. (2003), Coppinger et al. (1980) and Lucking-Reiley
(1999)).
The prevalence of jump-bidding presents a puzzle for standard auction theory. In the
independent private values (IPV) setting, researchers have long recognized the strategic
equivalence of ascending and second-price (Vickrey) auctions; to wit, the celebrated bidding
outcome in second-price auctions – that it is a dominant strategy for bidders to bid their true
valuations (Vickrey (1961), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Milgrom and Weber (1982))– can be
translated into an analogous strategy for ascending auctions: bidders should stay active in the
auction by submitting bids just marginally above the standing bid, until the standing bid
surpasses their true valuations. As mentioned above however, observed bidding behavior
deviates substantially from this ―straightforward bidding‖ benchmark, due mainly to anomalous
2

See Isaac, Salmon and Zillante (2007), Plott and Salmon (2004) and Cramton (1997) for details
of this behavior.
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jump-bidding. As a result, there is a small but growing theoretical literature to explain jump
bidding. In this paper, we attempt to discriminate between these theories by executing a number
of field experiments in which we manipulate the ease with which bidders can jump-bid. As far
as we are aware, this is the first paper in which field experiments are employed to assess
explanations of jump-bidding.3
Background: jump-bidding
One standard model of English auctions – and one in which the equivalence between secondprice and English auctions holds in the independent private values setting – is the so-called
―button‖ or clock auction (Milgrom and Weber (1982)), in which the price is set by a clock
which rises automatically, and bidders indicate their willingness to pay the current price by
holding down a button. Once a bidder releases his button, however, he ―drops out‖ of the
auction, and can no longer re-enter.
While analytically attractive, this clock auction is, however, not the typical auction form used in
practice. In the typical ascending bid auction, there is no ―clock‖, and the price sequence forms
endogenously, consisting of bid amounts which are chosen by the individual bidders; hence, at
any moment during the auction, bidders can submit bids which exceed the minimum acceptable
bid (that is, jump), instead of simply deciding whether to stay in or drop out at the current price.
In this setup, there are two compelling explanations for jump bidding which have been
emphasized in the literature.4 First, bidders may jump in order to signal one's high valuation,
and thereby eliminate competition by intimidating rivals. Second, bidders may be impatient and
face time costs of bidding, so that they jump in order to shorten the auction and, thereby, avoid
the bidding costs.

3

Lucking-Reiley (1999), in his field experiments with Magic cards, did increase the bid increment
size of higher priced cards at the request of bidders. However, this was not a systematic treatment in his
study.
4
Raviv (2007) contains a discussion and comparison of the models of jump bidding which have
been proposed in the literature.
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These two explanations have different implications on seller revenue, which forms the basic
premise for our empirical work below. Intuitively, intimidative jump bidding benefits buyers by
reducing competition, which will lower seller revenue. On the other hand, when bidders are
impatient, opportunities to end the auction sooner by jump bidding should, all else equal, not
change the allocation of the auction, but raises bidders' willingness-to-pay, thus enhancing seller
revenue. Next, we examine the intimidation and impatience hypotheses of jump bidding more
closely.
Jump-bidding for signalling and intimidation. Avery (1998) constructs an equilibrium
signaling model with jump bidding. In a two-stage setting in which a preliminary jump-bidding
stage is followed by a traditional open-exit ―clock‖ auction, Avery shows that there are a
continuum of equilibria involving jump-bidding in which the seller's expected revenue is
bounded above by the revenue in the straightforward equilibrium, which has no jump bidding.
In this setting, the ability to jump-bid allows the competing bidders to coordinate on asymmetric
strategies in the second-stage auction: a bidder with more favorable information, by jumping
aggressively in the initial stage, signals his more favorable information and, at the same time,
―selects‖ to play a more aggressive strategy in the second stage, and intimidates his rivals to
adopt more passive bidding strategies in the second stage. Importantly for our empirical
analysis, the asymmetric equilibria selected by the jumping behavior Pareto-dominate the
symmetric equilibrium, thus decreasing seller revenue on average.5
Jump-bidding to overcome impatience. Another important explanation for jump bidding in the
existing literature is that bidding in ascending auctions involves time costs which are absent in
simultaneous sealed-bid auctions. Several authors have introduced the idea of bidding costs that
are incurred by all bidders, and which must be incurred for each submitted bid.. Bidding costs
do seem plausible in many bidding environments, and can be motivated by bidders' cost of time
or simple impatience. For models in this vein, see Daniel and Hirschleifer (1997), Easley and

As Avery notes, this effect counteracts the ―linkage principle‖, whereby open auctions (such as
the ascending auction) yield greater expected seller revenue than sealed-bid auctions, in an affiliatedvalue setup.
5
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Tenorio (2004), Hoerner and Sahuguet (2007), and Isaac, Salmon and Zillante (2007). Time
costs introduce a ―war of attrition‖ component to ascending auctions and, in such a setting,
bidders benefit from the ability to jump-bid, because auctions end sooner.
Generally, jump-bidding arising from bidder impatience or bidding costs tends to increase
seller revenue. Milgrom (2004, pp. 128-132) provides a version of this argument. Essentially,
any IPV auction, no matter whether bidding costs are present and no matter whether jumping is
allowed, is payoff-equivalent to the standard sealed-bid second-price auction. That is, the
presence of bidding costs or the ability to jump-bid does not affect the equilibrium allocation of
the object (which always goes to the bidder with the highest valuation), but only the equilibrium
transfers (prices) paid by the bidders. However, when bidding costs are present, the ability to
jump-bid increases the total surplus; because the auction can end sooner, costly bidding can be
avoided. Because seller revenue is the residual from total surplus minus bidders' payoff, then, it
must be higher when jumping is allowed.6 Correspondingly, both the costly bidding model in
Daniel and Hirschleifer (1997) and the bidder impatience model in Isaac, Salmon and Zillante
(2007) are characterized by higher seller revenues as bidders are allowed to submit jump bids
and hence end the auction sooner.7 Experimental evidence reported in Isaac, Salmon, and
Zillante (2005) confirm that, indeed, revenues in ascending auctions fall when bidders are forced
to bid straightforwardly (and not allowed to jump).8
This distinction between the revenue-enhancing versus revenue-decreasing effects of jumpbidding is a crucial distinction between the impatience vs. intimidation explanations of jumpbidding, and will be an important focus of our empirical analysis below. Formally, the Avery
and Milgrom models, which are the main models we consider here for, respectively, the
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Obviously, we are assuming here that the seller is not impatient, and does not likely incur time
costs proportional to the length of the auction.
7
Indeed, certain features of eBay auctions, such as proxy bidding and the ―buy it now‖ option, can
be interpreted as attempts by sellers to reduce bidding costs or shorten auction length which, accordingly,
should lead to higher expected revenue.
8

Also, Roberts and Sweeting (2010) describe a (non-auction) sequential bidding procedure
in which revenues can increase when jump bidding is allowed.
5

intimidation and costly bidding stories of jump bidding, differ in their informational
assumptions: Avery assumes that bidders' valuations are affiliated, while Milgrom maintains an
IPV assumption. Hence, strictly speaking, testing between these two models is actually a joint
test of both IPV vs. affiliated values as well as intimidation vs. costly bidding.9 Nevertheless,
the competing hypotheses that intimidative bidding lowers seller revenue, while allowing
impatient bidders to jump raises revenue, have intuitive appeal, and in what follows we will
emphasize this distinction between the models rather than the differences in informational
assumptions..
2. Field experiments: Used-car Auctions at copart.com
The empirical importance of jump bidding, coupled with the contrasting revenue implications of
some key explanations, call out for empirical work to determine the explanations for real-world
jump-bidding behavior. However, testing hypotheses about jump-bidding is difficult using field
data, mainly due to data requirements. In order to isolate jumps, the complete sequence of bids
observed in an ascending auction must be recorded and available to the researcher. However, in
the majority of real-world ascending auctions, typically only the final bid submitted by each
participating bidder is recorded, making such data inappropriate for testing theories of jumpbidding.10
For these reasons, we design a set of unique field experiments11 using an online ascending
auction for automobiles, in order to evaluate the various explanations for jump-bidding described
above. Specifically, we created an experiment with Copart Inc., the largest auction house for
salvage vehicles in the world. In these auctions, we manipulated the ease with which bidders
could engage in jump-bidding, by restricting the maximum amount of the bid that could be

9

Indeed, Raviv (2007) uses this distinction as the basis for a test of common vs. private values in
open-outcry car auctions in New Jersey.
10
This is true in typical data from online auction sites (such as eBay; see, e.g. Song (2004)), as well
as from timber auctions run by the US Forest Service (Haile and Tamer (2003)). See Athey and Haile
(2002) for additional discussion of inferential difficulties with ascending auction data.
11
See Harrison and List (2004) for a discussion on the use of field experiments.
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submitted above the current standing price. Before describing our experimental design in detail,
we begin with a description of Copart and its online auction mechanism.
Copart sells well-over a million cars annually through its on-line virtual auction. On average,
each business day, Copart auctions around 5,000 vehicles on its site. Copart is an intermediary
that obtains the vehicles from finance companies, banks, dealers, fleets, rental car companies and
the insurance industry. Copart has over 150 facilities throughout the United States, Canada and
the United Kingdom. Buyers are from around world and auctions are conducted each business
day at various Copart facilities. Our experiments utilize Copart's largest auction yard (in
Houston, Texas) and another geographically different yard in upstate New York to examine the
effect of jump bidding restrictions on observed auction outcomes. Given the large scale of the
auctions run by Copart, any systematic effects of jump bidding on revenues is likely to be
economically meaningful.
We use data from 24 auctions – 13 run under the company's baseline parameters, and 11 run
under altered parameters introduced by us. The volume varies across the sales, but each auction
has approximately 500 vehicles offered for sale. The scale of the experiment is comparable to
that of the sequencing experiments with used car auctions reported in Grether and Plott (2009).
Relatedly, Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2009), use field experiments with a used automobile auction
company to explore how providing more information (in the form of ―Standardized Condition
Reports‖ describing a used car's condition) to bidders affects auction outcomes, particularly
revenues.
Copart Auctions: main features
Here we describe the important features of the ascending auctions run by Copart. In order to
participate, a buyer must first register an account to access the system. Following this, the buyer
will be able to access the ―current sales‖ button to view all of the auctions going on that day, the
locations of the auctions, and the start times. Buyers can join an auction at any time. Buyers
can also view vehicles in upcoming auctions. Each auction shows pictures of the vehicle up for
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auction, its make, model and year, along with the list of details shown in Table 1. Figure 1
shows a typical auction screen from the Copart auction site.
The car to be auctioned is called a lot and is sold sequentially in lanes at each facility called a
yard. Once the starting price is determined, the bid increment is set based on the current bid.
Table 2 shows how the bid increments change during the course of an auction, depending on the
level of the current (or ―standing‖) bid.
Once the auction is underway, bidders can submit bids in real time that are equal to one of the
following options:
(i) the current bid plus the minimum increment; or
(ii) the current bid plus 5 times the minimum increment; or
(iii) the current bid plus 10 times the minimum increment.
As shown in Figure 1, the buttons for the different bid choices available to the bidders are
located prominently on the lower right-hand side of the bidder screen.
Once a bidder submits one of these three bids it becomes the new standing bid and if no new
standing bid is made in two seconds, then there is a five second count down displayed on the
bidder screen. If no new standing bid is provided in those five seconds the auction ends. Thus, if
no bid is received in seven seconds the auction is over. In our data the actual median time
between bids is about one second with the average time approximately 2.5 seconds. The
distribution of interbid times is bimodal with a large mode at zero (presumably the automatic
increments for bidders with higher limit prices) and a second smaller mode at 7 seconds.
Histograms of the distribution of interbid times for the New York and Texas yards are presented
in, respectively, Figures 2 and 3. In some cases the time between bids exceeds seven seconds, but
is never greater than eleven seconds. These longer intervals are caused by delays due to the
online bidding environment.
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In addition, Copart‘s auctions have two distinctive features.. First, for most lots offered for sale
there is a secret reserve price12; that is, a minimum bid which is unobserved to bidders at the
time they choose their bids, such that if the highest bid in the auction falls below it, the seller has
the option to not sell to the highest bidder.13 Importantly, if the minimum bid is met during the
course of the virtual auction, an announcement is made that the lot is ―sellin’ all the way‖.
Second, if the bidding does not reach the reserve price the seller may negotiate with the high
bidder or in some cases with the second highest bidder. Copart‘s new revised auction site
specifically highlights this feature noting that bidders may engage in negotiations with sellers
who ―reveal or eliminate their minimum bid requirement to speed up the final sale to you.‖ As
we will see below, these aspects of the auction interact in interesting (and unforeseen) ways with
the experimental jump-bidding manipulations in our field experiments.
Experimental Design: interventions in bid increments
The goal of our interventions in our field experiments was to change the ease with which bidders
could jump-bid; that is, how easy it was for bidders to submit bids which were substantially
larger than the current standing bid. To wit, we manipulated the size of the jumps that bidders
could choose when submitting their bid. As we noted above, the standard Copart auction rules
allow bidders to submit jump-bids which are either 5 or 10 times the bid increment above the
current bid. We call this the baseline treatment, and denote it by (1,5,10). We introduced two
contrasting treatments. First, we have a limited jump-size treatment which restricts jump bids to
only 2 or 3 times the bid increment above the current bid. We denote this treatment by (1,2,3).
Second, we have an enhanced jump-size treatment which allows bidders to bid 10 or 20 twenty
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If there is no minimum bid required, this is listed as a pure sale in the auction. If there is a
minimum bid required, it is always secret to the bidders (but they know that there is a reserve price on the
lot).
13
Secret reserve prices are actually commonly observed in real-world auctions, but not completely
understood from an auction-theoretic point of view. See Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) and Katkar and
Reiley (2006) for empirical and experimental work exploring secret reserve prices, and Elyakime et
al.(1994), Vincent (1995) for theoretical analyses.
9

times the bid increment above the current bid.14 In the enhanced (limited) jump-size treatment,
it is easier (harder) for bidders to jump, in the sense that a desired bid level $X(>0) above the
current standing bid is easier (harder) to achieve under the enhanced (limited) treatment than
under the other treatments.
Two Copart yards – in Houston, Texas and upstate New York -- were used in our study. The
Texas yard has greater volume with two sales per week while the New York yard and all the
other company yards have weekly sales. The volume per sale varies, but averages around 500
vehicles per sale. At both yards insurance companies are the owners of around 40% of the
vehicles offered for sale. At the New York site, the other main sources of vehicles are
governments and municipalities (20 %) and charities (18 %). Notably, used car dealers account
for only about 10% of sales in New York. The seller mix at the Texas site, however, is quite
different; dealers have the most prominent presence there, and account for 45% of the lots
offered for sale. Below, we will attribute some of the observed differences in seller behavior
between the Texas and New York sales to these differences in seller populations between the two
sites.
Table 3 lists the sequence of our treatments by date and yard. For each lot there is information
about the item and summary bid data. The information on the lot includes the description (make,
model year), damage including repair cost (seller‘s estimate), mileage, title type and state of
registration and the number of times the lot has been previously auctioned. In our empirical work
below, these are the main variables used to control for heterogeneity across lots. Information
about the auction includes the minimum bid, the starting bid, number of bids and jump bids, the
high bid, the selling price (listed as zero if the seller did not accept the price), the high bidder
(coded) including the state and nationality of the high bidder and the seller‘s identity (coded)
and, for some of the sales, the type of the seller. The final sale price may differ from the high bid
as a result of negotiations between the seller and the first or second highest bidder. In addition,
for teach lot we observe the complete sequence of bids and bidder identities, allowing us to
We had initially proposed a treatment that eliminated jumps completely (ie. ―(1,1,1)‖), but this
was not feasible due to software limitations in Copart's online bidding system.
14
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determine accurately whether a bidder jumped (ie., submitted a bid more than one increment
above the standing bid), and the amount of the jump.

3. Empirical results
In this section we present and discuss the main findings from our field experiments. As
discussed above, our main goal going into the project was to test between two compelling
explanations of jump-bidding in ascending auctions: signaling/intimidation vs. bidder
impatience. However, as will be apparent below, there were some additional features of the
auction which we did not anticipate, and which end up playing an important role in interpreting
the empirical results. We begin with some discussion of general trends in the data, followed by
a more specific regression-based analysis.
Initial results
Summary statistics for the two yards and the three treatment conditions are given in Table 4.
First, we confirm that the treatments are effective in that the proportion of jumps in both the
limited and enhanced jump-size treatments are significantly different from the proportions in the
baseline (1,5,10) treatment. The observed treatment effects are sensible with the number of
jumps increasing when the jump size is restricted, and falling when the jump size is increased.
The actual number of jumps varies somewhat across the auction sites. At the New York location
approximately 1.3 percent of the bids are jumps with roughly six percent of the buyers jumping
at least once. Jump bids are more frequent at the Texas site with about nine percent of the
bidders jumping at least once and jump bids accounting for approximately 2.5 percent of the
bids. These figures are consistent with jump bids being mistakes (for bidders who jump the
modal number of jump bids is one).
Second, looking at average price with the three treatments do not reveal any substantial revenue
effects of changing the allowable jump sizes. The average high bid does not vary significantly
nor does the average sale price (conditional on the vehicle being sold). Moreover, the auctions in
11

Texas take about twice as long as those at the New York yard, and the high bids are roughly
twice those at New York.
The proportion sold decreases at the Texas site when jumps are restricted and at the New York
yard when the jumps are larger. Thus, the overall revenue effects are ambiguous and not
consistent across the two locations. Variation in the composition of the seller groups may
account for some of these differences between the two sites. While insurance companies in our
sample sell about 90-95 percent of their cars at auction, dealer sales rates are mainly in the 60
percent range. The re-auctioning15 of cars at the Texas site is about twice the rate observed at the
New York site. Looking at the number of times a vehicle has been auctioned, the median is one
in New York and two in Texas and the numbers are about double at the quartiles and, at the 99th
percentile: 7 for New York and 14 for Texas.
Theories of strategic jump bidding often have equilibria with the bidding starting and ending
with jump bids. In our data this does not happen. The fraction of first bids that are jumps is
somewhat higher than the overall jump rates at both locations (0.022 in New York and 0.036 at
the Texas site). At the New York site the proportion of final bids that are jumps is about the same
(1.5 percent) as the overall proportion of jump bids. In Texas, final bids are more likely to be
jumps with about 3.2% of the sales ending with jumps. At both locations the ‗winning bids‘ are
likely to come from bidders who jumped at some time during the bidding on the lot. In New
York about 4 percent and in Texas 11 percent of the high bids were made by bidders who
jumped during the auction on that lot-- quite modest numbers.
Detour: Repeat-bidding. Before moving on to regression results which show how robust these
findings are to various controls, we discuss a particularly striking bidding phenomenon which we
observed in Copart auctions, which appears anomalous at first glance – that of repeat bidding.16
We say that a buyer engages in repeat bidding when he/she submits two consecutive bids. Thus,
repeat bidders are raising their own bids. These auctions move very fast with the typical lot
15

A re-auctioned lot is a lot that was previously offered in an earlier auction but not sold.
In the history of the Copart auctions, repeat bidding at one time was not allowed. However, an
uproar by the bidders caused Copart to allow such bidding to be part of its current design.
16
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lasting under a minute, so that it is possible that bidders may accidentally bid against themselves
(―tremble‖). This explanation is plausible for much of the repeat bidding at the New York site.
There, most bidders who repeat-bid do so only once or twice in a weekly sale, and the most
frequent do so on the order of only 10 to 20 times. The fraction of repeat bids is generally less
than 2% of the bids. In Texas, however, the proportion of repeat bids is much higher, ranging
from 18% to over 24%. Most buyers either do not repeat bid or do so only occasionally.
However, some buyers bid against themselves several hundred times in one day (the maximum
number of times we observe this is 811!).
The timing of the repeat bids may provide some explanation for them. Recall that if no new bid
is received for two seconds, the message ―going once, two times, etc.‖ is given until a new bid is
received or the sale ends if the time without a bid reaches 11 seconds. Repeat bids occur with a
longer lag, with a longer time interval from the preceding bid, than other bids. At a typical sale,
the median time interval between repeat bids is six seconds while it is only two seconds for the
non-repeating bids. Recall that reserve pries at Copart auctions are secret (that is, unknown by
bidders when they choose their bids). Recall that, if the bidding starts above the secret reserve
price or goes above it during the bidding, a ―selling all the way‖ announcement is made on the
web site; however, virtually all of the repeat bids take place below the reserve price. At the
Texas site the proportion of bids that are repeats drops by more than half when the minimum bid
is passed. The proportion of jump bids also drops, but by a lesser amount. This suggests that
repeat bidding and, to a lesser extent, jump bidding, may be symptomatic of a kind of search
behavior by which bidders try to discover the reserve price, but do not want to risk going over it.
Another possibility is that some of the repeat bids are shills working with specific sellers. We
have no robust statistical evidence for this story, but rather a colorful anecdote. Namely, the
individual buyer in Texas mentioned above who submitted 811 repeat-bids in one day was the
high bidder (hence, ―won‖) 75 auctions over the course of two consecutive sales, but failed to
obtain any of these cars – that is, in each of the 75 cases, the seller declined to sell the car to this
individual. This buyer certainly looked like a shill bidder.
13

More broadly, however, we looked at the identities of the sellers whose vehicles had repeat bids,
and we did not find any particular pattern. Also, the frequent repeat bidders did not concentrate
their bids on the vehicles of a few sellers. This suggests, but hardly proves, that the repeat
bidders are simply hurrying things along, which is consistent with impatience as a primary
motivating factor in these auctions. While the auctions do move quickly, with most lasting
under one minute, each weekday there are many of these auctions at sites all over North
America, each with on order of 500 vehicles put up for bids. A bidder interested in one or more
of the cars being sold must somehow manage to monitor the sale (or submit a maximum
willingness to pay prior to the auction). Submitting jump bids or repeatedly clicking and, thus,
raising your own bids, can be useful ways of hurrying things along. Along these lines, this type
of jump bidding decreases substantially once the secret reserve price is met.
Regression results: testing intimidation vs. impatience
Next, we discuss results from regressions to distinguish more narrowly between the intimidation
versus impatience stories of jump bidding. As we discussed before, the main empirical
implication we focus on is that, if bidders jump to intimidate rivals, we should see a detrimental
effect of jump bidding on sellers' revenues, while the opposite obtains if impatient bidders
simply jump in order to ―speed up the clock‖ and end the auction sooner.
The results from the lot-level regressions are shown in Table 5. As controls, we included the
car's odometer reading (―Odometer‖), a dummy for whether this reading represents the actual
mileage (―Actual odometer‖), the number of bidders (―# buyers‖), the seller's estimated value
(―seller book value‖), and dummies for the lane, week, and day of the week of the auction. We
did not include time (e.g. week or day) dummies for the New York yard as there was only one
sale each week. (We did experiment with various time trends and found no substantive changes
in the results.) The main coefficients of interest are those on SMALLJUMP and LARGEJUMP
which are, respectively, indicators for the 1,2,3 and 1,10,20 experimental treatments. (The
excluded category is when the increments are 1,5,10.)
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For the Texas sales, the regression results in Table 5 show that restrictions on jump-bidding have
little effect on the high bids in the auctions. However, for the New York sales the coefficient of
SMALL JUMP is positive and marginally significant, indicating that restricting jump-bidding
increases slightly (by around $170) the high bid in the auctions. This is consistent with the
―jump-bidding as intimidation‖ hypothesis, and suggests that auctions are more competitive
when jump-bidding is restricted, leading to higher potential revenue for the sellers.

The results

are basically the same if the dependent variable is final sale price, conditional on being sold
(columns B and D in Table 5 ).
Confounding effects: seller strategic behavior. The picture presented in the regressions so far
is incomplete. As we discussed before, due to the prevalent use of secret reserve prices, sellers
are not required to sell the car at the high bid. Table 6 presents some summary statistics
describing seller behavior. Obviously, we see that seller behavior varies substantially depending
on whether the minimum bid (i.e., secret reserve price) is exceeded in the auction. For the
Texas sales, we see that when the final bid is below the minimum bid, sellers sell the car at the
final bid only 40.7% of the time, and withdraw the car 36.3%. When the final bid exceeds the
minimum bid, however, sellers sell the car 85.4% of the time. The 14.6% no sales, even when
the final bid exceeds the minimum bid arises from buyers reneging their winning bid.17 When a
buyer reneges, the seller can negotiate with the second highest bidder to sell the lot. This results
in sales 70% of the time. Similar figures hold for the New York sales.
Motivated by these numbers, we next consider regression specifications which jointly model the
final sales prices along with the seller's decision of whether or not to sell the car.

Since the

final sales prices is equal to zero for lots which the seller decides to withdraw, we augment the
price regression with a second ―selection‖ equation which explains the seller's decision to sell
(vs. withdraw) the car. Estimates from this augmented model – obtained using Heckman's twostep method – are presented in Table 7 for, respectively, the Texas and New York sales.18

17

Buyers that renege on their bid must pay a penalty.
By estimating such a model, we allow for common unobservables – presumably unobserved
characteristics of a car – which affect both the bids placed on the car as well as the sellers' decisions to
18
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The results from this specification are quite different from the results presented earlier.
Specifically, for the Texas sales, we find that SMALLJUMP now has a negative and significant
effect on the final sale price: restricting jump bidding reduces, on average, the final sales price by
$816, not a small amount. This is not consistent with the intimidation story, which would
predict higher revenues for the seller when jump bidding is restricted, but rather with the
impatience story.
In the New York sales, however, we find that LARGEJUMP has a negative and significant effect
on the final sales prices (implying a substantial $1,114 decrease in the prices on average). This
supports the intimidative bidding hypothesis. Apparently, then, our evidence suggests that jump
bidding may have an intimidation component in New York, but not in Texas.
The selection equations, which explain whether a lot is sold at the high bid (vs. withdrawn or
negotiated by the seller), are reported in Columns B and D in Table 7. Not surprisingly, the
results here mirror those in Columns B and D in Table 5: we see that in Texas, SMALLJUMP
also has a significantly negative effect on the propensity that a car is sold, but in New York, it is
LARGEJUMP that has the significantly negative effect.
Taken together, these results suggest some striking differences between the Texas and New York
sales: restricting jump bidding in Texas (resp. enhancing jump bidding in New York) tends to
lower the high bids, which are less likely to attain the seller's minimum, and hence trigger the
seller to either withdraw the car, or negotiate with the high bidder for a higher price. In net,
however, this compensating behavior of the seller is not enough to equalize revenue across the
different treatments; the average revenue in auctions where jump bidding is restricted in Texas
(resp. enhanced in New York) is still lower.

withdraw the car. The minimum bid plays the role of the instrument included in the selection equation,
which is excluded from the price regression. The validity of this instrument relies on an assumption that
the minimum bid is not correlated with any other unobservables which may affect final prices (such as a
seller's private information). This is partly justified because, for the most part, the minimum bid is secret
(unknown to bidders) , which lessens its direct effect on prices.
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Why are Texas and New York different? The results here beg the question, as to what factors
drive the difference in the results between the Texas and New York sales? As mentioned above,
an important difference between the two markets is the seller mix: specifically, car dealers are
more prominent in the Texas market, accounting for around 45% of the cars sold, while dealers
are account for only 10% of the cars sold in New York. The other major group of sellers in
these auctions are insurance companies, who are disposing of vehicles which have been
―totaled‖; in both markets, insurance companies account for around 40% of the cars sold.
A priori, one might expect dealers to behave more strategically; because they arguably have
lower costs of holding inventory than insurance companies, they may be more inclined to use the
particular institutions of the Copart auctions – such as the secret reserve prices and opportunities
for renegotiation or withdrawing their cars – to their advantage. We examine this hypothesis
more formally; for a subset of the sales in both New York and Texas, we were able to obtain, in
addition to the sellers‘ identity codes, their classification by types. In Table 8, we present the
same type of figures as in the Table 6, but now broken down by lot sold by car dealers versus
insurance companies. The difference in seller behavior between these two groups is very
striking.

First, across all sales, we see that insurance companies sell the majority (59%) of their

cars at the high bid in the auction, and negotiate on only around 35% of sales. Dealers sell only
a quarter (24%) at the high bid, and negotiate around 30% of their sales. Moreover, dealers
withdraw (and presumably resell at a later date) 43% of their cars. Grether and Plott (2009)
observed similar behavior with dealers selling a substantially smaller fraction of vehicles brought
to auctions than the large sellers (banks and finance companies in their data).
Dealers are able to engage in such extensive negotiation and withdrawing behavior by
manipulating the secret reserve price. We see that the high bid in the auction fails to exceed the
minimum bid for about 76% (=1093/1430) of the cars sold by dealers, but only 24% of the time
for cars sold by insurance companies. Regressions (not reported) confirm that, indeed,
controlling for car characteristics, dealers set minimum bids systematically higher than do
insurance companies.
17

The findings provide at least a partial reconciliation of the earlier regression results. The greater
dealer presence in the Texas sales, and their more strategic behavior, limit the scope and
effectiveness of bidder strategies that reduce seller revenue. That is, strategic sellers can
counteract tendencies towards lower revenue by setting higher minimum bids and engaging in
post-auction price negotiation. At the same time, the longer duration of the Texas auctions may
also lead to greater bidder impatience, so that restrictions in jump bidding (as in the
SMALLJUMP treatments) lead to lower surplus and, therefore, lower seller revenue, which is
what we find.
The opposite is true in the New York sales. Here, sellers are less strategic, so that enhanced
opportunities to jump-bid (as in the LARGEJUMP treatments) may invite bidders to engage in
intimidating behavior, leading to lower seller-revenue; this is what we find.
Caveat: Non-monotonic effects of jumpsize on seller revenue. We end our analysis with a
caveat of sorts. It is noteworthy that we find asymmetric and non-monotonic effects of the
jump-bidding treatments on seller revenue in both markets. That is, for Texas, we find that
restricting the jumpsize (SMALLJUMP) reduces revenues relative to the baseline, but we don't
find that, symmetrically, increasing the jumpsize (LARGEJUMP) increases revenues.
Similarly, for New York, increasing the jumpsize (LARGEJUMP) reduces revenues, but
decreasing the jumpsize (SMALLJUMP) doesn't increase revenues. The revenue effects do not
appear to be monotonic, at least in the range of jumpsizes which we consider in our experiments.
This may suggest that, to a first-order, the baseline jumpsizes are close to optimal, to
maximizing expected seller revenue; hence, changes from the baseline either reduce revenue, or
have no significant effect.

This interpretation may imply that perhaps treatments involving

larger changes in jump sizes may be needed to better understand the effects of jump bidding
opportunities on seller revenue in these auctions.
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4. Conclusions
In the literature on auctions, jump bidding has received substantial attention. Since jump bidding
is frequently observed in practice, natural questions arise: why does it occur, and what are the
revenue implications? Two of the leading explanations are (i) strategic signaling and
intimidation; and (ii) impatience. In this paper we report the results of field experiments with the
treatment variables being the sizes of allowed jump bids. One treatment restricted participants to
smaller jump sizes than the company had been allowing, and the other increased the jump sizes.
We analyzed data from 24 online auctions at which over 15,000 vehicles were auctioned.
We find that behavior is much different at the two yards we examined. In New York, where
there are more insurance companies that just want to sell their inventory, there are fewer unsold
lots by the sellers than in Texas. In New York, our regressions show that enhanced opportunities
to jump bidding lower revenue, which is consistent with the intimidation explanation. However,
in Texas, where there are many dealers offering cars but selling a smaller fraction of them, the
results show that restrictions on jump bidding lower revenue, which is consistent with the
impatience explanation. While our focus in this paper has been on bidder behavior, our results
suggest that the interaction between the strategic behavior of both bidders and sellers is
important in these auctions. In ongoing work, we are conducting additional field experiments to
gauge the effect of seller strategies on auction outcomes.
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Figure 1
Screenshot of Copart Bidder Screen
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Figure 2
Interbid Times
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Figure 3
Interbid Times
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Table 1
Lot Details and variable definitions

Actual Cash Value

Repair Cost
Title State/Type
Odometer
Primary Damage
Secondary Damage
VIN
Body Style
Color

Engine
Drive and Cylinders
Fuel
Keys

Estimated retail value of the lot as submitted to
Copart by the seller. If the lot has been damaged,
this is the value prior to the occurrence of the
damage. The number is only informational.
Estimated cost to repair the vehicle as submitted
to Copart by the seller of the vehicle.
Title type denotes the ownership documents that
will be transferred to the buyer.
Odometer codes are shown to reflect the known
reliability of the odometer reading.
Location of the major damage on the car
Location of the minor damage on the car
Vehicle Identification Number assigned by the
manufacturer.
Body Style is the manufacturer's designation of
the vehicle's configuration
Color listed on this site is the common color
name that reasonably represents the exterior
color of the vehicle.
Engine is the motor
Manufacturer's designation of the vehicle's
power train.
Designates the fuel type used by the engine as
designated by the VIN.
Indicates whether Copart is in possession of the
keys to the lot.
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Table 2
Minimum Bid Increments
Bid Range

Minimum Increment

$0 - $5

$1

$5 - $40

$5

$40 - $100

$10

$100 - $1,000

$25

$1,000 - $5,000

$50

$5,000 - $25,000

$100

$25,000 - $50,000

$250

$50,000 - $100,000

$500

$100,000 - $10,000,000

$1,000
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Table 3
Treatment Application
Yard
Texas
Texas
Texas
Texas
Texas
Texas
Texas
Texas
Texas
New York
Texas
New York
Texas
Texas
New York
Texas
New York
Texas
New York
Texas
Texas
New York
Texas
New York

Date
2/19/10
2/23/10
2/26/10
3/2/10
3/5/10
4/20/10
4/23/10
4/27/10
4/30/10
5/19/10
5/25/10
5/26/10
5/28/10
6/1/10
6/2/10
6/4/10
8/11/10
8/17/10
8/18/10
8/20/10
8/24/10
8/25/10
8/27/10
9/1/10

Treatment
1,5,10 (benchmark)
1,2,3 (restricted)
1,5,10 (benchmark)
1,5,10 (benchmark)
1,2,3 (restricted)
1,5,10 (benchmark)
1,2,3 (restricted)
1,2,3 (restricted)
1,5,10 (benchmark)
1,5,10 (benchmark)
1,5,10 (benchmark)
1,2,3 (restricted)
1,10,20 (enhanced)
1,10,20 (enhanced)
1,5,10 (benchmark)
1,5,10 (benchmark)
1,5,10 (benchmark)
1,5,10 (benchmark)
1,10,20 (enhanced)
1,10,20 (enhanced)
1,10,20 (enhanced)
1,10,20 (enhanced)
1,5,10 (benchmark)
1,5,10 (benchmark)

# of Lots in Sample
408
497
560
490
549
515
727
486
642
714
689
658
689
538
586
527
549
613
549
703
450
551
746
577
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Table 4
Average Bidding Behavior for each Yard/Lot/Treatment
Yard

# of
Bidders

High
Bid

Frequency of
Jump Bids

Frequency of
Repeatbidding
.193

Size of
Jumps

Proportion
Sold

Texas
4.28
5401
.024
460
.765
(1,5,10)
Texas
4.52
5638
.035
.184
187
.676
(1,2,3)
(.01)
(.23)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
(.00)
Texas
4.17
5345
.023
.192
923
.779
(1,10,20)
(.22)
(.77)
(.00)
(.54)
(.00)
(.30)
New York
3.02
2372
.015
.014
356
.918
(1,5,10)
New York
2.87
2731
.019
.014
154
.926
(1,2,3)
(.08)
(.06)
(.01)
(.47)
(.08)
(.52)
New York
3.21
2318
.006
.013
508
.860
(1,10,20)
(.01)
(.73)
(00)
(.77)
(.00)
(.00)
Figures in parentheses are significance levels for testing equality with baseline (1,5,10).

Time in
Seconds
81.63
87.12
(.00)
86.25
(.00)
43.86
44.51
(.65)
46.03
(.07)
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Table 5 Regression results for New York and Texas Sales19
New York
Dependent
variable:
SMALLJUMP
LARGEJUMP
Odometer
Actual odometer
#buyers
Seller book value
Constant

Week dummies
Day of week
dummies
Make dummies
Lane dummies
Primary damage
dummies
#observations

Yard

Texas

OLS
High bid
(A)
0.1653
(1.82)*
0.0201
(0.21)
-0.004
(0.80)
0.4256
(4.87)***
0.1655
(8.05)***
0.2638
(57.68)***
-0.1298
(0.20)

OLS
Final sale
price>0
(B)
0.1596
(1.73)*
-0.0304
(0.31)
-0.0063
(1.00)
0.3440
(3.85)***
0.1596
(7.55)***
0.2679
(55.63)***
1.697
(2.12)**

yes

Yard

OLS
High bid
(C)
0.1055
(0.74)
0.0660
(0.57)
0.0091
(1.87)*
1.05
(13.26)***
0.0511
(3.27)***
0.3435
(132.32)***
0.391
(0.33)

OLS
Final sale
price>0
(D)
0.0389
(0.33)
0.0375
(0.41)
-0.018
(4.81)***
1.0041
(16.98)***
0.0345
(2.78)**
0.2717
(92.03)***
1.3585
(0.85)

yes

yes

yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

4170

3760

11499

8473

19

T-stats in parentheses. ***: statistically significant at 1%, **: statistically significant at 5%; * statistically
significant at 10%.
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Table 6 Seller Behavior
Texas
All lots:
Sell at high bid
Negotiate price
Withdraw
Total:
Lots with high bid
< minimum bid:
Sell at high bid
Negotiate price
Withdraw
Total:
Lots with high bid
> minimum bid:
Sell at high bid
Negotiate price
Withdraw
Total:

New York

# lots

%

6321
2189
3026
11536

54.8
19
26.2

3221
1818
2868
7907

3100
371
158
3629

40.7
23
36.3

85.4
10.2
4.4

# lots

%

All lots:
Sell at high bid
Negotiate price
Withdraw
Total:

3269
505
410
4184

78.1
12.1
9.8

Lots with high bid
< minimum bid:
Sell at high bid
Negotiate price
Withdraw
Total:

495
401
261
1157

42.8
34.7
22.6

Lots with high bid
> minimum bid:
Sell at high bid
Negotiate price
Withdraw
Total:

2774
104
149
3027

91.6
3.4
4.9

28

Table 7 Heckman Selection Model results for New York and Texas Sales20
New York
Dependent
variable:
SMALLJUMP
LARGEJUMP
Odometer
Actual odometer
#buyers
Seller book value
Constant

Final sale price
(A)
0.5640
(1.23)
-1.1092
(2.16)**
-0.0427
(1.35)
0.5561
(1.26)
0.1475
(1.43)
0.2795
(11.95)***
-2.335
(0.63)

Minimum bid

Yard
Pr(Final sale
price>0)
(B)
0.1364
(1.84)*
-0.3685
(5.48)***
-0.0050
(1.08)
0.0547
(0.80)

0.0283
(6.97)***
1.3419
(2.47)**
-0.0907
(10.53)***

Texas
Final sale price
(C)
-0.8404
(2.39)**
0.0949
(0.34)
0.0074
(0.63)
1.3109
(6.73)***
0.1114
(2.95)**
0.2142
(23.89)***
0.6248
(0.12)

Yard
Pr(Final sale
price>0)
(D)
-0.2488
(4.68)***
0.0499
(1.12)
0.0071
(3.09)***
0.2207
(7.16)***

0.0300
(17.94)***
-0.2210
(0.49)
-0.1392
(37.99)***

Selection term21

12.0055
(6.53)***

Week dummies
Day of week
dummies
Make dummies
Lane dummies
Primary damage
dummies

yes

yes

yes

yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes

yes

yes

yes

4170

4170

11499

11499

#observations

9.0027
(27.95)***

20

T-stats in parentheses. ***: statistically significant at 1%, **: statistically significant at 5%; * statistically
significant at 10%.
21
Inverse Mill's ratio.

29

Table 8 Seller Behavior: Car Dealers vs. Insurance companies
Car Dealers
All lots:
Sell at high bid
Negotiate price
Withdraw
Total:
Lots with high bid
< minimum bid:
Sell at high bid
Negotiate price
Withdraw
Total:
Lots with high bid
> minimum bid:
Sell at high bid
Negotiate price
Withdraw
Total:

Insurance Companies

# lots

%

343
472
615
1430

24
33
43

273
262
558
1093

67
212
58
337

25
24
51

20
63
17

# lots

%

All lots:
Sell at high bid
Negotiate price
Withdraw
Total:

3269
505
410
3215

59
36
5

Lots with high bid
< minimum bid:
Sell at high bid
Negotiate price
Withdraw
Total:

470
228
86
784

60
29
11

Lots with high bid
> minimum bid:
Sell at high bid
Negotiate price
Withdraw
Total:

1434
924
73
2431

59
38
3
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